The Tashkent Declaration
Following the 1965 India-Pakistan war, President General Ayub Khan and Prime
Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri were invited to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, by the Soviet
government. After protracted negotiations brokered by Moscow, both sides agreed to issue a
declaration ri January 1966. The Tashkent Declaration did not propose any concrete
solution to the Kashmir problem, but merely stated that the interest of peace in the region
end particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent arid indeed the interests of the peoples of
India and Pakistan were not served, by continuance of tensions between the two countries. It
was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides
set forth its respective position.”
Selig Harrison’s Propose: The Trieste Mode
Selig Harrison, a noted American scholar, has suggested that Kashmir under Indian control should be partitioned. Jammu and Ladakh should become part of the Indian union, while the Kashmir valley would be “united with sizeable Muslim pockets in Jammu and Ladakh.” India may give to this “new state,” according to Harrison, “far-reaching autonomy as part of a Trieste-type solution,” and in return, Pakistan would “grant the same degree of autonomy to Azad Kashmir.” These new entities will be autonomous in all areas except defence, foreign affairs, communication, currency, foreign aid and trade.
Both India and Pakistan would withdraw their armed forces under UN supervision, retaining the right to reintroduce them under specified circumstances. Pakistan would to terminate its support of Kashmiri insurgents. The present LoC will become an international border. As in the Trieste settlement, it would be a porous border, with Kashmiris free to travel back and forth without Indian and Pakistani visas. Gilgit, Hunza and Baltistan would remain part of Pakistan, thus retaining Pakistan’s access to China.
As the first step, India would have to split the state, integrating most of Jammu and Ladakh with the Indian Union, while giving special autonomous status to a new state uniting the Kashmir Valley and the sizeable Muslim pockets in Jammu and Ladakh. India could then and offer to give this new state far-reaching autonomy as part of a Triestetype solution, under which Pakistan would grant the same degree of autonomy to Azad Kashmir.
Both New Delhi and Islamabad would surrender authority to these new entities, except in the area of defence, foreign affairs, communications, and currency. The new regions would gain the right to conduct independent foreign aid and foreign trade dealings. This settlement, if accompanied by large-scale economic inputs, would be acceptable to many Liberation Front leaders and a growing number of war-weary Kashmiris, However, India shows no signs of moving in this direction, as its current policy aims to militarily crush and the insurgency before pursuing a political solution.
New Delhi fears that giving Kashmir special autonomous status would set a art of precedent for demands by other potentially secessionist states. The controversy over what to do in Kashmir is part of the developing debate over whether the entire Indian federal system should be more decentralised. This debate is directly linked to the sensitive problem of Hindu-Muslim relations in India. Nominally, India is a secular state, but the secular principle is under attack from the Hindu right. Advocates of secularism fear that an autonomous, Muslim-majority Kashmir would end up seeking independence or accession to Pakistan, thus exposing the 90 million Muslims in other parts of India to continuing attack as potential traitors.